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Abstract	
This	article	interrogates	a	commonly	articulated	idea	in	relation	to	the	criminalisation	of	
offensive	language:	namely,	that	swearing	at	police	challenges	their	authority	and	thereby	
deserves	criminal	punishment.	Drawing	on	critical	discourse	analysis,	the	article	examines	
representations	of	swearing	at	police	officers	in	offensive	language	cases	and	parliamentary	
debates,	including	constructions	of	power,	authority	and	order.	It	contributes	to—but	also	
denaturalises—conceptions	about	police	power	and	authority	in	the	context	of	public	order	
policing.	 The	 article	 argues	 that	 criminal	 justice	 discourse	 plays	 a	 significant	 and	 often	
under‐acknowledged	role	in	naturalising	the	punishment	of	swearing	at,	or	in	the	presence	
of,	police	officers.		
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Introduction	
	
But	who	suffers	most	from	our	increasingly	contemptuous	youth,	so	ready	to	give	
a	gobful	to	authority?	…	Police	will	tell	you	what	rabble	they	must	now	deal	with,	
and	how	they	struggle	to	command	the	respect	that	has	been	stripped	from	them	
by	 courts,	 lousy	 parents,	 and	 the	 barbarians	 behind	 the	 new	 up‐yours	
entertainment.	
	
That’s	why	the	NSW	[New	South	Wales]	Police	Association	is	furious	at	Williams’	
judgment,	and	why	the	police	force	is	considering	an	appeal.	Their	authority	on	the	
streets	is	being	compromised.	(Bolt	2010:	30)1	
	
The	use	of	offensive,	indecent,	obscene	or	insulting	language	in	or	near	a	public	place	is	a	crime	
in	 all	 Australian	 states	 and	 territories.2	 Fines	 and	 charges	 for	 offensive	 language	 are	 often	
initiated	 by	 police	 in	 response	 to	 their	 frustration	 with	 what	 police	 perceive	 to	 be	 ‘an	
unacceptable	occupational	 hazard’:	 being	 insulted,	 criticised	 or	undermined	by	persons	using	
four‐letter	words	(Brown	et	al.	2015:	526).		
	
Recent	 law	 reform	 and	 academic	 inquiries	 (for	 example,	McNamara	 and	 Quilter	 2013,	 2014;	
Methven	 2017a,	 2017b;	 New	 South	 Wales	 (NSW)	 Law	 Reform	 Commission	 2012;	 NSW	
Ombudsman	 2009)	 have	 questioned	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 offensive	 language	 crimes,	 with	 the	
Australian	 Law	 Reform	 Commission	 (ALRC)	 being	 the	 latest	 government	 agency	 to	 pose	 the	
question:	 ‘Should	offensive	 language	remain	a	criminal	offence?’	(ALRC	2017:	13).	This	article	
also	embarks	on	a	normative	inquiry	into	the	legitimacy	of	offensive	language	crimes.	It	does	so	
by	 adopting	 the	 lens	 of	 critical	 discourse	 analysis	 (CDA)	 to	 analyse	 how	 these	 crimes	 are	
represented	 and	 justified	 in	 criminal	 justice	 debates.	 In	 particular,	 the	 article	 examines	 how	
criminal	 justice	 discourse	 naturalises	 the	 notion	 that	 police	 occupy	 a	 position	 of	 authority	 in	
public	space	that	should	not	be	challenged	by	swear	words.		
	
The	idea	that	swearing	at	police	deserves	criminal	punishment	is	constructed	through	language.	
Accordingly,	an	interdisciplinary	approach	to	law,	which	profits	from	critical	linguistic	theories,	
can	unmask	how	language	is	used	to	justify	the	criminalisation	of	persons	and	their	behaviour	
(Coyle	2010:	19).	This	article	begins	by	providing	an	overview	of	laws	that	criminalise	swearing	
in	 Australia.	 It	 theorises	 conceptions	 of	 power,	 authority	 and	 order,	 and	 explains	 how	 these	
concepts	 pertain	 to	 offensive	 language	 crimes.	 It	 then	 examines	 judicial,	 media	 and	 political	
discourse	to	illustrate	how	swearing	is	characterised	as	an	affront	to	a	stratified	order	in	which	
the	public	must	show	deference	to	police.	Finally,	the	article	argues	against	using	the	criminal	law	
to	promote	the	maintenance	of	unequal	power	structures	by	punishing	those	who	swear	at	police.	
It	highlights	instances	where	swear	words	have	been	used	to	challenge	unequal	power	relations	
between	protesters	and	politicians,	and	Indigenous	Australians	and	police	officers.		
	
Offensive	language	crimes	
Various	Australian	states	and	territories	have	offensive	 language	crimes:	 laws	that	criminalise	
the	use	of	offensive,	indecent,	obscene	or	insulting	words,	in	or	near	a	public	place.	One	example	
is	 s	4A	of	 the	Summary	Offences	Act	1988	 (NSW),	which	makes	 it	 an	offence	 to	 ‘use	offensive	
language	in	or	near,	or	within	hearing	from,	a	public	place	or	a	school’.	The	adjectives	‘offensive’,	
‘indecent’,	‘obscene’,	and	so	on,	are	not	defined	in	legislation.	Instead,	broad	definitions	of	these	
adjectives,	many	of	which	overlap,	have	been	developed	 in	 case	 law	(Methven	2017a:	81‐87).	
These	definitions	generally	require	judicial	officers	to	consider	what	would	be	offensive,	indecent	
or	obscene	to	the	‘reasonable	person’	with	regard	to	‘contemporary	community	standards’	(see,	
for	example,	Del	Vecchio	v	Couchy;	Heanes	v	Herangi;	McCormack	v	Langham).	The	question	of	
whether	the	crime	of	using	offensive	language	in	NSW	is	a	strict	liability	offence,	or	whether	it	
incorporates	subjective	mens	rea	(mental)	elements	remains	unresolved	(McNamara	and	Quilter	
2013:	555‐559).		
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Despite	being	characterised	as	‘petty’	offences,	offensive	language	crimes	can	attract	significant	
punishments	ranging	from	a	fine	of	AU$660	in	NSW	to	up	to	six	months’	 imprisonment	in	the	
Northern	Territory	and	in	Queensland	(for	example,	Summary	Offences	Act	2005	(Qld)	s	6).	As	an	
alternative	 to	 charging	 someone	 with	 offensive	 language,	 police	 officers	 in	 most	 Australian	
jurisdictions	 can	 issue	on‐the‐spot	 fines	 (criminal	 infringement	notices	 (CINs),	 also	known	as	
penalty	notices)	for	offensive,	obscene	or	indecent	language	(see,	for	example,	Criminal	Procedure	
Regulations	(NSW)	reg	106	and	sch	3;	Criminal	Procedure	Act	1986	(NSW)	ss	333‐337;	Methven	
2014,	2017a:	110‐114).		
	
The	 literature	documents	 that	offensive	 language	CINs	and	charges	are	 ‘part	of	an	oppressive	
mechanism	of	control	of	Aboriginals’	(Wootten	1991:	184;	see	also	Aboriginal	Justice	Advisory	
Council	1999;	Brown	et	al.	2015;	Lennan	2006;	Methven	2017a;	NSW	Ombudsman	2009;	Walsh	
2005;	White	2002).	In	a	2009	study,	the	NSW	Ombudsman	found	that,	of	those	CINs	issued	for	
offensive	language	to	Aboriginal	people	between	2002	and	2007,	70	per	cent	of	the	language	used	
was	directed	at	police	only,	and	23	per	cent	at	police	and	others	(NSW	Ombudsman	2009:	57).	In	
other	words,	the	‘victim’	of	offensive	language	is	‘almost	invariably	the	police	officer’	(White	and	
Perrone	2005:	46).	In	the	period	April	2016‐March	2017,	2,770	adults	were	proceeded	against	
for	offensive	language	in	NSW,	1,609	(58	per	cent)	of	whom	received	a	CIN	for	offensive	language.	
Indigenous	Australians	accounted	 for	17	per	cent	of	all	adults	and	22	per	cent	of	all	 juveniles	
proceeded	 against	 in	 NSW	 for	 using	 offensive	 language	 (NSW	Bureau	 of	 Crime	 Statistics	 and	
Research	2017),	despite	comprising	just	three	per	cent	of	the	NSW	population	(Australian	Bureau	
of	Statistics	2017).	The	overwhelming	majority	of	CINs	and	charges	for	offensive	language	are	in	
response	 to	 the	 words	 ‘fuck’	 and	 ‘cunt’	 (NSW	 Anti‐Discrimination	 Board	 1982:	 48‐49;	 NSW	
Ombudsman	2009:	57).		
	
CDA	and	criminal	justice	discourse		
Having	established	that	offensive	language	crimes	are	commonly	used	by	police	in	response	to	
those	who	swear	at	or	near	them	in	public	space,	this	article	considers	how	discourse	naturalises	
the	notion	 that	swearing	at	police	disrespects	authority	and	warrants	criminal	punishment.	 It	
does	 so	 by	 using	 CDA	 as	 its	 primary	methodological	 tool	with	which	 to	 analyse	 a	 number	 of	
offensive	language	case	studies,	focusing	on	the	2009	NSW	Local	Court	case	Police	v	Grech	and	the	
2007	 Supreme	Court	 of	Western	Australia	 case	Heanes	v	Herangi.	 CDA	 is	 a	 form	of	 discourse	
analysis	which	views	language	as	both	shaping	and	shaped	by	society	(Mayr	and	Simpson	2010:	
51).	Analysts	work	from	the	premise	that	there	is	no	neutral	representation	of	reality;	reality	is	
constructed	 and	 reconstructed	 through	 language	 (Fowler	1987:	67).	CDA	 scholarship	 aims	 to	
denaturalise	 ideologies	 and	 unequal	 power	 relations	 that	 have	 become	 naturalised	 through	
linguistic	strategies	(Pennycook	2001:	80‐81).	There	is	no	single	method	of	‘doing	CDA’;	scholars	
have	fashioned	their	own	approaches	drawing	from	a	range	of	linguistic	ideas,	methods	and	tools	
(van	Dijk	2001:	95;	Wodak	2001:	4).		
	
CDA	 has	 an	 ‘intense	 linguistic	 character’,	 relying	 on	 linguistic	 categories	 like	 vocabulary,	
metaphor,	 transitivity,	 agency	 and	modality	 (Martinez	 2007:	 127),	many	 of	which	 have	 been	
derived	 from	Halliday’s	 systemic‐functional	 grammar	 (Halliday	1985:	 xvi–ii).	 The	 selection	of	
linguistic	devices	is	a	matter	for	each	researcher	to	determine,	based	upon	their	relevance	to	the	
research	 question	 (Martinez	 2007:	 127).	 This	 article	 focuses	 primarily	 on	 the	 linguistic	
techniques	of	metaphor,	collocation,	transitivity	and	presuppositions.		
	
CDA	can	be	distinguished	 from	other	 critical	 linguistic	approaches	 (for	 example,	 Fowler	et	 al.	
1979)	in	that	it	identifies	discourse	as	 ‘the	basic	unit	of	communication’	(Wodak	2001:	2).	The	
article	 adopts	 Fairclough’s	 (1989,	 1992:	 37‐61)	 and	 van	 Leeuwen’s	 (2008)	 conceptions	 of	
discourse,	drawn	from	the	more	abstract	approach	to	discourse	analysis	of	French	philosopher	
and	 historian	 Michel	 Foucault	 (1972,	 1977,	 1980a).	 Fairclough’s	 (1992)	 model	 of	 discourse	
consists	of	three	interconnected	dimensions:	
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1. Text;		
2. Discourse	practice	(how	texts	are	produced,	interpreted	and	distributed);	and		
3. Social	 practice	 (how	 power	 relations	 and	 ideologies	 are	 reproduced,	 challenged	 or	
transformed	through	discourse).	
	
Fairclough	 has	 offered	 three	 corresponding	 descriptions	 of	 these	 dimensions:	 description—
concerned	with	the	formal	properties	of	a	text;	interpretation—concerned	with	the	relationship	
between	text	and	interaction	(the	processes	of	production	and	interpretation);	and	explanation—
concerned	with	the	relationship	between	interaction	and	social	context	(Fairclough	1989:	26).	
Following	this	approach,	this	article	considers	not	only	the	language	of	selected	texts,	including	
offensive	language	case	law,	court	transcripts,	parliamentary	debates	and	newspaper	articles,	but	
also	their	production,	interpretation	and	relationship	to	society	(Luke	2002:	100).	
	
In	this	model,	discourse	does	not	simply	refer	to	an	extended	stretch	of	text;	it	is	also	a	way	of	
signifying	a	particular	social	practice	from	a	particular	perspective	(Fairclough	1989:	24;	Wodak	
2001:	66).	Similarly,	van	Leeuwen	defines	discourses	as	‘socially	constructed	ways	of	knowing	
some	aspect	of	reality’	(van	Leeuwen	2009:	144).	The	phrase	criminal	justice	discourse	is	used	to	
refer	 to	socially	constructed	ways	of	 signifying	 reality	 in	 the	 field	of	criminal	 justice.	Criminal	
justice	discourse	is	not	one	consolidated,	homogeneous	voice	but	a	plurality	of	criminal	justice	
perspectives.	 Consistent	 with	 CDA’s	 aim	 to	 denaturalise	 power	 structures,	 the	 article	
concentrates	 on	 how	 ‘primary	 definers’	 (Hogg	 and	 Brown	 1998:	 18‐19)	 in	 criminal	 justice	
debates—politicians,	 judicial	 officers,	 police	 officers,	 lawyers	 and	 the	 media—represent	
swearing	 at	 police,	 and	 suggests	 how	 the	 reality	 that	 they	 construct	 has	 been	 (or	 could	 be)	
resisted.	
	
Conceptions	of	power,	authority	and	order		
The	methodological	approach	undertaken	 in	 this	study	 is	enhanced	by	a	 theorisation	of	 three	
abstract	concepts:	‘authority’,	‘order’	and	‘power.’	In	criminal	justice	debates,	each	of	these	words	
functions	largely	as	a	symbol,	allowing	those	who	employ	them	to	supply	part	of	their	meaning	
(Cohen	 1985:	 15).	 Each	 term	 has	 a	 significant	 meaning	 potential:	 a	 capacity	 for	 ambiguous,	
heterogeneous,	overlapping	and	sometimes	contradictory	interpretations	(Fairclough	1992:	75),	
and	this	ambivalence	can	be	exploited	by	the	user	and	the	interpreter	of	the	word	in	question.	
	
The	concept	of	 ‘police	power’	and	its	scope	are	by	no	means	straightforward.	The	law—in	the	
form	of	statutory	provisions	and	common	law	rules—is	a	source	and	an	 ‘instrument’	of	police	
power,	which	is	‘at	once	complex	and	partial’	(Foucault	1980b:	141).	In	NSW,	for	example,	various	
powers,	functions,	discretions	and	responsibilities	of,	and	constraints	on,	police	are	contained	in	
the	Law	Enforcement	(Powers	and	Responsibilities)	Act	2002	(NSW)	and	the	Police	Act	1990	(NSW),	
among	others.	These	statutes	bestow	upon	police	 ‘powers’	to	limit	and	control	others’	actions,	
but	also	contain	provisions	that	act	as	a	check	on	any	irresponsible	or	excessive	use	of	power.		
	
The	power	of	police	 is	not	only	defined	by	statutes	and	common	law	rules	(Dixon	1997;	Hogg	
1983:	13)	but	 is	 also	 supplemented	by	 their	 ‘vast	 and	 largely	unscrutinised	discretion’	 (Hogg	
1983:	6)	to	choose	how,	and	whether	or	not,	to	implement	‘the	law’.	Police	have	at	their	disposal	
informal	and	extra‐legal	means	to	 limit	or	restrain	others’	behaviours	and	 liberty	(McConville	
Sanders	and	Leng	1993:	112).	These	discretionary	powers	are	not	‘legal	rules’	but	‘police	rules’	
(Neocleous	2006,	emphasis	in	original):	the	choices	that	police	make	to	either	exercise,	or	refrain	
from	exercising,	their	ability	to	caution,	search,	arrest,	detain	or	issue	a	CIN	to	an	individual.		
	
Alongside	the	 laws	and	extra‐legal	 tools	at	police	officers’	disposal,	 the	concept	of	power	as	 it	
pertains	 to	 police	 officers	 can	 be	 conceived	 of	 in	 a	 number	 of	 more	 abstract	 senses:	 power	
exercised	by	dominance	or	coercion;	power	exercised	routinely	by	consent;	and	power	as	a	form	
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of	action	or	relation	between	people	(Foucault	1977,	1980b;	Gramsci	1971;	Weber	1914).	The	
first	 sense	 of	 power,	 power	 as	dominance,	 has	 its	 origins	 in	 sociologist	 and	 philosopher	Max	
Weber’s	(1914)	study	of	authority	in	modern	and	pre‐modern	states.	Power	in	this	sense	resides	
within	the	State	and	within	other	sovereign	organisations,	and	authority	 is	power	attained	by	
force	(its	 imposition)	or	coercion.	Power	conceived	of	as	dominance	focuses	on	the	corrective	
power	of	the	state	and	 its	 institutions	(including	 the	police	 force)	 to	secure	the	compliance	of	
others,	even	in	the	face	of	resistance	(Weber	1914	cited	in	Mayr	and	Simpson	2010:	2).		
	
The	 second	 sense	of	power,	power	 exercised	 routinely	by	consent,	 draws	on	political	 theorist	
Antonio	Gramsci’s	 concept	 of	 hegemony:	 the	mechanisms	 through	which	dominant	 groups	 in	
society	successfully	persuade	subordinate	groups	to	accept	the	former’s	own	moral,	political	and	
cultural	values	and	institutions.	These	mechanisms	include	constructing	alliances	and	integrating	
(rather	than	purely	dominating)	subordinate	classes	through	concessions	or	ideological	means	
(Gramsci	1971	 in	Fairclough	1992:	92;	Mayr	and	Simpson	2010:	3).	The	more	 that	dominant	
individuals	 and	 institutions	 such	 as	 Parliament,	 the	 courts,	 and	 police	 build	 legitimacy	 by	
generating	consent	to	their	domination,	the	less	coercion	they	need	apply	(see	Cohen	1980:	102;	
Gramsci	1971;	Mayr	and	Simpson	2010:	3)	In	this	second	sense	of	power,	authority	is	conceived	
of	as	power	that	has	been	accrued	consensually,	through	naturalisation	of	its	use	over	time	(Paletz	
and	Harris	1975:	963).	Linguists	Mayr	and	Simpson	(2010:	2)	have	acknowledged	the	integral	
role	of	 language	in	legitimating	power:	power	 ‘needs	to	be	seen	as	legitimate	by	the	people	in	
order	to	be	accepted	and	this	process	of	legitimation	is	generally	expressed	by	means	of	language	
and	other	communicative	systems’.	This	article	draws	on	these	ideas	in	identifying	how	criminal	
justice	 discourse	 generates	 public	 consent	 to	 police	 authority,	 by	 representing	 this	 unequal	
power	relationship	as	natural,	logical	and	beneficial.		
	
The	final	sense	of	power	that	informs	the	article	is	Foucault’s	theorisation	of	power	as	productive	
and	relational.	In	this	theoretical	model,	power	is	not	understood	as	a	constraining	or	repressive	
force	(Foucault	1977,	1980a).	Nor	does	Foucault	understand	power	‘in	an	instrumental	sense,	as	
something	to	be	possessed	and	located	at	a	central	point’	(Hogg	1983:	13);	it	is	neither	fixed	nor	
objectively	determined.	Rather,	Foucault	conceptualised	power	as	productive:	as	a	form	of	action	
or	 relation	 between	people	 that	 is	 negotiated	 and	 contested	 through	 interaction.	As	 Foucault	
stated:	 ‘In	 reality	power	means	 relations,	 a	more‐or‐less	organised,	hierarchical,	 co‐ordinated	
cluster	of	relations’	(Foucault	1980a:	198).	Power	is	a	positive,	productive	force	with	constitutive	
effects:	
	
…	[it]	invests	them	[those	who	do	not	have	it],	is	transmitted	by	them	and	through	
them;	 it	 exerts	 pressure	 upon	 them,	 just	 as	 they	 themselves,	 in	 their	 struggle	
against	it,	resist	the	grip	it	has	on	them.	This	means	that	these	relations	go	right	
down	into	the	depths	of	society.	They	are	not	localised	in	the	relations	between	the	
state	and	its	citizens	(Foucault	1977:	27).	
	
Foucault’s	 theorisation	 of	 power	 is	 useful	 in	 framing	 swearing	 at	 police	 and	 the	 subsequent	
punishment	of	that	act	as	a	type	of	power	struggle.	In	this	power	struggle,	the	appropriate	way	
for	 a	 member	 of	 the	 public	 to	 behave	 around	 and	 speak	 towards	 a	 police	 officer	 is	 being	
negotiated	 and	 contested.	 From	 Foucault’s	 theoretical	 analysis,	 we	 see	 police	 not	 simply	 as	
possessing	power	or	having	authority.	Rather,	police	powers	and	their	authority	in	public	space	
are	subject	to	contestation	or	resistance.	Foucault	advises	that,	to	understand	power	relations,	
‘we	should	investigate	the	forms	of	resistance	and	attempts	made	to	dissociate	these	relations’	
(1982:	780).	For	Foucault,	‘forms	of	resistance’	are	the	‘chemical	catalyst	so	as	to	bring	to	light	
power	relations,	 locate	their	position,	and	 find	out	 their	point	of	application	and	the	methods	
used’	 (1982:	 780).	 Against	 this	 theoretical	 backdrop,	 the	 following	 section	 employs	 CDA	 to	
interrogate	judicial,	media	and	political	depictions	of	swearing	at	police.	Case	studies	in	which	
swear	words	have	been	used	to	resist	power	are	analysed	in	the	final	section	of	 the	article	 to	
demonstrate	how	swearing	can	be	an	important	tool	to	contest	unjust,	unequal	power	relations.		
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Case	study:	Police	v	Grech		
At	around	4.40	pm	on	5	November	2009,	Adam	Royds,	a	senior	constable	with	the	City	Central	
Commuter	Crime	Unit,	was	standing	inside	the	ticket	barrier	of	Bondi	Junction	railway	station	in	
Sydney,	Australia.	Royds	was	 in	 full	 uniform	at	 the	 time.	A	 young	man,	Henry	Grech	 (Grech),	
walked	up	to	the	gate	next	to	the	ticket	barrier	and	opened	it.	Royds	asked	Grech	if	he	had	a	valid	
rail	ticket.	Grech	replied	that	he	was	going	to	the	toilet	and	he	had	just	completed	a	university	
exam.	Royds	told	Grech	that	he	was	in	a	restricted	area	and	that	he	needed	a	rail	ticket.	Grech	
stated:	‘I	know	my	rights.	I’m	going	to	take	it	to	court’,	to	which	Royds	replied:	‘Good.	I’ll	see	you	
there’.	Royds	said	he	would	be	sending	Grech	a	ticket	in	the	mail	for	entering	a	restricted	area	
without	a	ticket.	According	to	Royds,	Grech	walked	away	in	a	huff,	gritting	his	teeth,	clenching	his	
jaw	and	shaking	his	head.	When	Grech	was	about	five	metres	away,	he	uttered	the	word	‘prick’.	
The	following	conversation	took	place:	
	
Royds:	What	was	that?	
Grech:	Nothing	
Royds:	You	called	me	a	prick.		
Grech:	No,	I	said:	‘That’s	it’.		
Royds:	You’re	a	liar.	They’ll	be	giving	you	a	ticket	for	offensive	language	as	well.	
(Transcript	of	Proceedings	2010:	4‐5)	
	
Grech’s	offensive	language	charge	was	heard	by	Magistrate	Robbie	Williams	at	Waverley	Local	
Court	in	Sydney	on	3	May	2010.	The	police	prosecutor	submitted	that	although	the	word	‘prick’	
was	 at	 ‘the	 lower	 end	of	 the	 scale’	 it	was	nonetheless	offensive	 in	 that	 ‘it	was	meant	 to	 raise	
resentment	and	disgust	and	that	it	was	calculated	to	annoy’.	The	prosecutor	stated	that,	although	
members	of	 the	community	were	on	 the	platform	at	 the	 time,	 ‘the	word	used	was	offered	 for	
offending	the	witness,	Constable	Royd’	(Transcript	of	Proceedings	2010:	2).		
	
Grech’s	defence	solicitor	submitted	that	Grech	did	not	say	‘prick’	with	‘any	sexual	overtone’,	nor	
was	he	‘referring	to	anything	that	would	take	it	above	and	beyond	the	meaning	of	a	nasty	person’.	
He	further	submitted	that	police	officers	are	more	accustomed	to	hearing	offensive	language	and,	
while	this	might	not	justify	the	use	of	the	word	‘prick’	‘in	a	moral	sense’,	it	was	relevant	as	a	matter	
of	law	(Transcript	of	Proceedings	2010:	3‐4).		
	
In	delivering	judgment	on	whether	Grech	had	used	offensive	language,	Magistrate	Williams	asked	
what	‘a	reasonable	man’	(sic)	would	consider	offensive	in	the	circumstances.	His	Honour	noted	
the	absence	of	any	evidence	which	suggested	children	or	elderly	people	were	present	when	the	
word	was	used.	Magistrate	Williams	dismissed	the	charge,	reasoning	that	‘prick’	was	in	‘common	
usage’	in	the	Australian	community	and	that	a	reasonable	person	would	not	be	offended	‘due	to	
its	current	everyday	use’	(Transcript	of	Proceedings	2010:	6‐7).		
	
Media	and	political	responses		
Members	 of	 the	 NSW	 Police	 Association,	 the	 media	 and	 the	 NSW	 Parliament	 were	 quick	 to	
criticise	 Magistrate	 Williams’	 decision	 in	 Police	 v	 Grech.	 The	 Secretary	 of	 the	 NSW	 Police	
Association	 argued	 that	 the	 legal	 system	 should	 not	 make	 police	 ‘second‐class	 citizens’	 and	
‘punching	 bags	 for	 society’	 (Chambers	 2010).	 Conservative	 Australian	 media	 commentator	
Andrew	Bolt	(2010)	lamented	‘our	increasingly	contemptuous	youth’	who	were	‘so	ready	to	give	
a	gobful	to	authority’.	Bolt	blamed	the	courts	for	stripping	respect	from	police	and	compromising	
‘Their	authority	on	 the	streets’.	He	argued	that	 ‘magistrates	and	 judges’	were	guilty	of	double	
standards	in	‘authorising	an	abuse	of	lowly	police	that	they’d	probably	never	forgive	if	it	were	
aimed	 at	 them’	 (2010).	 When	 NSW	 Attorney‐General	 John	 Hatzistergos	 was	 questioned	 in	
Parliament	as	to	why	‘verbal	abuse	of	police	officers	continue[s]	to	be	treated	as	lesser	offences	
by	 magistrates	 in	 contradiction	 of	 community	 expectations’,	 Hatzistergos	 responded	 (2010:	
22649‐22650):	‘I	believe	that	police	officers	are	entitled	to	respect.	As	a	community	we	must	take	
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respect	more	seriously,	and	that	includes	ensuring	that	our	children	learn	its	value	at	a	very	early	
stage	of	their	lives’.	
	
Political	and	media	reactions	to	Grech’s	case	are	examples	of	recontextualisation	(van	Leeuwen	
2008,	2009)	 in	criminal	 justice	discourse,	 in	which	swearing	at	police	 is	 transformed	 into	 the	
more	intangible	act	of	 ‘disrespecting	authority’.	Recontextualisations	can	add	detail,	transform	
persons	and	events,	substitute	elements,	provide	legitimations,	eliminate	detail	or	shift	focus	(van	
Leeuwen	2008:	vii).	These	depictions	of	youth	disrespecting	‘police	authority’	and	magistrates	as	
either	supporting	police	(where	magistrates	convict	an	accused)	or	against	police	(where	they	
acquit	an	accused)	extend	beyond	Grech’s	case.	When	NSW	Magistrate	Pat	O’Shane,	an	Indigenous	
Australian	 magistrate,	 dismissed	 an	 offensive	 language	 charge	 against	 27‐year‐old	 Rufus	
Richardson	after	he	walked	up	to	police	patrolling	The	Rocks	in	Sydney,	‘gave	them	the	finger’	
and	said	‘Youse	are	fucked’,	media	commentators	questioned	Richard’s	acquittal.	Commentator	
Ross	Eastgate	lamented	a	supposed	decline	in	respect	for	police	authority:	‘Whatever	happened	
to	good	manners?	…	the	days	when	people	were	temperate	in	their	language,	were	deferential	to	
their	elders	and	had	respect	for	the	law	and	proper	authority?’	(Eastgate	2005).		
	
Politicians	went	 further	 than	 this,	 questioning	whether	Magistrate	 O’Shane	 should	 retain	 her	
office.	 Asked	 if	Magistrate	O’Shane	 should	be	 ‘sacked’,	 then	Liberal	Opposition	Member	Peter	
Debnam	replied:	 ‘I	 think	 the	Attorney‐General	does	need	 to	 start	 looking	at	 the	performance,	
especially	when	you	see	ongoing	campaigns	such	as	hers’	 (Australian	Associated	Press	2005).	
Then	opposition	police	spokesman,	Mick	Gallacher,	said	the	decision	‘give[s]	the	green	light	to	all	
those	yobbos	out	there	that	they	can	simply	abuse	the	cops,	and	the	cops	have	got	to	cop	it	on	the	
chin’	 (Australian	Associated	 Press	 2005).	 Other	 Liberal	 opposition	members	 casted	 doubt	 on	
Magistrate	O’Shane’s	capacity	to	assume	an	‘objective’	stance.	Malcolm	Kerr	stated	‘her	standard	
of	reasonable	behaviour	does	not	accord	with	what	the	general	public	expects	on	the	streets’	(Kerr	
2006:	22814,	emphasis	added)	while	Shadow	Attorney‐General,	Andrew	Tink,	argued:	‘The	Pat	
O’Shane	decision	on	offensive	language	must	not	stand	…	If	we	have	to	set	out	in	a	bill	what	words	
are	offensive	for	some	people	on	the	bench	to	get	the	message,	let	us	do	it’	(Tink	2005:	20628).		
	
These	reactions	highlight	a	key	assumption	about	offensive	language	crimes:	despite	it	not	being	
written	in	Australian	legislation	(Tasmania	aside)3	that	swearing	per	se	is	criminally	offensive,	
members	of	the	police,	the	judiciary	and	the	legislature	presume	that	such	crimes	should	punish	
four‐letter	words.	This	article,	however,	focuses	on	the	assumptions	that	swear	words	disrespect	
or	challenge	police	authority	and,	further,	that	the	criminal	law	is	the	appropriate	means	by	which	
to	 enforce	 respect	 for	 police.	 The	 following	 part	 continues	 to	 unpack	 these	 assumptions	 by	
focusing	 on	 parliamentary	 debates	 around	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 Summary	Offences	 Act	 1988	
(NSW).	
	
Representations	of	authority	and	power	in	political	discourse		
In	the	 lead	up	to	the	introduction	of	the	Summary	Offences	Act	1988	(NSW),	the	NSW	Liberal–
National	Party	Coalition	led	by	soon‐to‐be	Premier	Nick	Greiner	had	been	embroiled	in	a	fierce	
law‐and‐order	 campaign	 against	 the	NSW	Labor	Party.4	 The	Coalition	 eventually	 ‘out‐bid’	 the	
Labor	party	with	its	promise	to	give	‘police	full	powers	to	deal	with	offensive	behaviour’	which	
had	allegedly	been	‘taken	away’	from	police	by	Labor’s	repeal	of	the	Summary	Offences	Act	1970	
(NSW)	 (The	Sydney	Morning	Herald	 1988).	The	Coalition	was	duly	 elected	 in	1988.	When	 the	
Summary	Offences	Bill	1988	was	debated	in	Parliament	in	June	of	that	year,	both	the	Coalition	
and	Labor	parties	agreed	that	more	police	with	greater	powers	were	needed	to	clean	up	public	
streets,	quell	an	unruly	youth	and	re‐establish	‘order’	(Hogg	and	Brown	1998:	21).	At	the	time,	
Coalition	member	Bruce	Jeffery	argued	in	the	NSW	Legislative	Assembly	that:	
	
…	the	police	have	been	hamstrung	by	their	 lack	of	power	to	deal	with	offensive	
behaviour,	and	have	been	laughed	out	of	court.	If	a	policeman	lays	a	charge	and	it	
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is	dismissed,	 it	does	not	look	good	for	the	police.	If	a	policeman	sees	a	group	of	
youngsters	walking	the	streets,	as	I	see	quite	late	at	night	when	returning	home	
from	functions,	he	needs	power	to	be	able	to	disperse	them	so	that	they	are	not	
involved	in	crimes	such	as	stealing	…	
	
Until	police	have	adequate	powers,	there	will	be	no	respect	for	police	on	the	beat.	
The	former	Labor	Government	failed	dismally	to	take	heed	of	the	courts	and	what	
people	 in	 the	community	were	saying	about	police	 lacking	powers	 to	deal	with	
street	crime	…		
	
I	reiterate	that	we	must	return	to	police	the	means	to	deal	with	offensive	behaviour	
in	all	circumstances.	If	police	doubt	their	authority,	their	position	is	weakened	and	
others	will	work	on	that	weakness.	The	police	need	the	backing	of	the	Parliament.	
(Jeffery	1988:	1154)	
	
An	analysis	of	linguistic	techniques	used	in	this	excerpt—metaphors,	causality,	collocation	and	
transitivity—reveals	 how	 discourse	 legitimises	 police	 power	 and	 authority	 in	 public	 space.	
Jeffery	transformed	(van	Leeuwen	2008:	17‐18)	the	crimes	of	offensive	language	and	offensive	
conduct	 by	 substituting	 these	 offences	 with	 the	 phrase:	 ‘the	 means	 to	 deal	 with	 offensive	
behaviour	in	all	circumstances’,	along	with	the	abstract	terms	‘power’	and	‘powers’.	There	is	also	
a	noticeable	collocation	of	 the	words	 ‘police’,	 ‘power’	 and	 ‘authority’,	where	collocation	 is	 the	
routinised	use	of	words	in	association	with	each	other	(Fairclough	1989:	113‐115).	This	mirrors	
broader	 ‘law	 and	 order’	 rhetoric,	 in	which	 it	 is	 taken	 for	 granted	 that	 the	words	 ‘police’	 and	
‘power’	should	co‐occur	(as	in	the	common	refrain	‘we	need	more	police	with	greater	powers’:	
Hogg	and	Brown	1998:	35‐37).		
	
Significantly,	Jeffery	conceptualised	power	in	metaphorical	terms:	as	a	physical	object	that	police	
‘have’,	 ‘need’	 or	 ‘lack’.	 In	 the	 phrases	 ‘their	 lack	 of	 power’,	 ‘police	 lacking	 powers’,	 ‘he	 needs	
power’	 and	 ‘have	 adequate	 powers’,	 the	 abstract	 noun	 ‘power’	 occurs	 as	 the	 object	 of	 the	
transitive	 verbs	 ‘lack’,	 ‘need’	 and	 ‘have’—all	 verbs	 suggesting	 a	 physical	 process	 (Lakoff	 and	
Johnson	2003:	26).	In	the	final	example,	the	presence	of	the	adjective	‘adequate’	before	power	
depicts	power	 as	quantifiable.	 Lakoff	 and	 Johnson	provide	 a	 similar	 illustration	of	 how	 rising	
prices	 can	 be	 viewed	metaphorically	 as	 an	 entity	 via	 the	 noun	 ‘inflation’,	 as	 in	 the	 examples:	
‘Inflation	is	lowering	our	standard	of	living’	and	‘If	there’s	much	more	inflation,	we’ll	never	survive’	
(Lakoff	and	Johnson	2003:	26,	emphasis	in	original).	Viewing	an	abstract	experience	or	concept	
like	rising	prices	or	power	as	an	entity	‘allows	us	to	refer	to	it,	quantify	it,	identify	a	particular	
aspect	 of	 it,	 and	 perhaps	 even	 believe	 that	we	 understand	 it’	 (Lakoff	 and	 Johnson	 2003:	 26,	
emphasis	 in	 original).	 Through	 Jeffery’s	 metaphorical	 representations,	 ‘power’	 assumes	 the	
character	of	something	that	is	concrete	and	identifiable:	an	object	of	which	police	need	to	possess	
an	‘adequate’	amount.	If	that	power	is	‘lacking’,	the	obvious	solution	is	that	it	must	be	‘return[ed]’	
to	police.	Jeffery’s	use	of	the	transitive	verb	 ‘return’	in	the	clause	‘we	must	return	to	police	the	
means	to	deal	with	offensive	behaviour	 in	all	circumstances’	 is	also	 ideologically	significant	in	
that	to	return	something	is	to	restore	a	former	position.	One	can	only	have	something	returned	
to	them	if	it	previously	belonged	to	them.	These	language	choices	naturalise	the	assumption	that	
police	inherently	need	and	possess	power	in	public	space.		
	
Another	 aspect	 of	 Jeffery’s	 rhetoric	 is	 that	 it	 contains	 metaphors	 of	 strength	 and	 weakness,	
evident	in	the	phrases	‘police	have	been	hamstrung	by	their	lack	of	power’	and	‘[i]f	police	doubt	
their	 authority,	 their	 position	 is	 weakened	 and	 others	 will	 work	 on	 that	 weakness’.	 These	
metaphors	 postulate	 not	 only	 power	 and	 authority	 but	 also	 strength	 as	 inherent	 qualities	 of	
police.	Significantly,	Jeffery	is	more	concerned	with	the	appearance,	rather	than	the	actuality,	of	
police	strength:	‘it	does	not	look	good	for	the	police’	and	‘[police]	have	been	laughed	out	of	court’.	
Thus,	an	increase	in	police	powers	is	rationalised	in	terms	of	managing	public	perceptions	and	
expectations	of	police.	Jeffery	did	not	specify	the	agent	in	these	clauses:	we	are	not	told	who	is	
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laughing	police	out	of	court,	nor	who	perceives	police	as	lacking	power.	Instead,	these	ideas	have	
been	framed	as	objective	truths.5		
	
An	 additional	 important	 ideological	 aspect	 of	 Jeffery’s	 characterisation	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	police,	power	and	authority	is	causality	(Fairclough	1989:	51).	Many	of	his	clauses	begin	
with	the	subordinating	conjunctions	‘if’	and	‘until’,	the	former	being	a	conjunction	to	express	a	
condition	 and	 the	 latter,	 a	 conjunction	 to	 express	 time.	 Jeffery	 represents	 cause	 and	 effect	 as	
axiomatic	in	the	examples:	‘If	a	policeman	lays	a	charge	and	it	is	dismissed,	it	does	not	look	good	
for	the	police’;	‘If	a	policeman	sees	a	group	of	youngsters	walking	the	streets	…	he	needs	power	
to	be	able	to	disperse	them’;	‘If	police	doubt	their	authority,	their	position	is	weakened’;	and,	‘Until	
police	 have	 adequate	 powers,	 there	 will	 be	 no	 respect	 for	 police	 on	 the	 beat’.	 These	
representations	of	cause	and	effect	depict	the	consequences	of	police	lacking	power—no	respect,	
more	crime	and	the	appearance	of	weakness—as	obvious	and	inevitable.	
	
The	 application	 of	 CDA	 to	 political	 rhetoric	 so	 far	 has	 demonstrated	 various	 ways	 in	 which	
discourse	can	naturalise	the	ideas	that	police	possess	power	and	have	authority	in	public	space,	
and	 that	 such	 authority	 should	 not	 be	 challenged.	 If	 one	 conceptualises	 an	 abstract	 concept	
through	a	certain	metaphorical	construction	(for	example,	power	is	an	object	that	police	possess),	
and	that	metaphor	is	accepted	as	logical	or	natural,	the	metaphor	can	downplay	or	hide	other	
aspects	of	that	concept:	‘To	operate	only	in	terms	of	a	consistent	set	of	metaphors	is	to	hide	many	
aspects	 of	 reality’	 (Lakoff	 and	 Johnson	 2003:	 221).	 An	 important	 ideological	 effect	 of	
conceptualising	 power	 as	 an	 object	 that	 police	 possess	 is	 that	 such	 a	 metaphor	 suppresses	
alternative	 ways	 of	 conceiving	 power	 in	 relation	 to	 police.	 One	 alternative	 conception	 is	
Foucault’s	 theorisation	of	power	as	 constitutive:	as	 a	 fluid	 form	of	action	or	 relation	between	
people,	which	is	negotiated	and	contested	in	interaction.	For	Foucault,	relationships	of	power	are	
‘strategic	games	between	liberties’	(Foucault	1988:	19)	where	these	relationships	are	unstable	
and	reversible,	forms	of	power	are	heterogeneous,	and	positions	of	relative	power	are	available	
not	 just	 to	 police,	 but	 to	 anyone	 (for	 discussion,	 see	 Hindess	 1996:	 98‐102).	 Within	 this	
framework,	police	could	not	‘lack’	power	and	one	could	not	‘return’	power	to	police,	for	power	
could	not	be	possessed	to	begin	with.	However,	Foucault’s	fluid	conceptualisation	of	power	would	
not	serve	the	ideological	purpose	of	depicting	a	stratified	public	order	in	which	police	possess	
power	and	command	authority.		
	
Whose	authority?	
An	important	linguistic	technique	that	depicts	authority	as	something	police	have	by	virtue	of	
their	occupation	is	the	use	of	presuppositions,	propositions	that	purport	to	tell	people	what	they	
already	know.	Because	of	this,	presuppositions	are	an	‘effective	means	of	manipulating	audiences’	
(Fairclough	1989:	153).	An	example	of	a	presupposition	is	Jeffery’s	phrase	‘their	authority’	in	‘[i]f	
police	doubt	their	authority,	their	position	is	weakened’.	Here,	the	possessive	pronoun	‘their’	cues	
the	operation	of	a	presupposition	(Fairclough	1989:	153).	The	notion	that	police	have	authority	
and	are	authority	figures	is	also	central	to	the	reasoning	in	the	2007	Supreme	Court	of	Western	
Australia	 case	Heanes	v	Herangi,	 based	on	which	 Johnson	 J	 upheld	 the	defendant’s	 disorderly	
conduct	charge.	This	case	is	doctrinally	significant	in	that	it	has	been	cited	as	authority	for	the	
principle	that	disrespecting	police	authority,	by	means	that	include	the	use	of	swear	words,	may	
provide	grounds	for	an	offensive	language	conviction	(Brown	et	al.	2015:	526).	
	
Case	study:	Heanes	v	Herangi		
In	that	case,	Heanes’s	charge	of	disorderly	conduct	by	using	offensive	language	centred	on	his	
words,	spoken	to	Constable	Herangi:	‘I	am	on	the	phone—I	am	on	the	phone.	I’m	fucking	talking	
to	my	dad.	Fuck	off’.	Heanes	had	used	this	 language	 ‘outside	the	Myers	 [department]	store’	 in	
inner‐city	Perth	during	‘school	holidays	and	there	were	several	children	around	within	hearing	
distance	 of	 the	 accused’.	 Constable	 Herangi	 also	 stated:	 ‘There	 were	 a	 few	 people	 standing	
around’,	maybe	15	people	in	the	vicinity’	(Transcript	of	Proceedings	2006:	5).6		
Elyse	Methven:	A	Little	Respect:	Swearing,	Police	and	Criminal	Justice	Discourse	
IJCJ&SD								67	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2018	7(3)	
In	the	hearing	of	Heanes’s	appeal	against	his	conviction	in	the	Supreme	Court	of	WA,	counsel	for	
the	respondent,	Mr	Lochore,	represented	the	defendant’s	words,	‘I	am	on	the	phone—I	am	on	the	
phone.	 I’m	 fucking	 talking	 to	 my	 dad.	 Fuck	 off’,	 as	 ‘a	 challenge	 to	 the	 authority’,	 a	
recontextualisation	in	which	Lochore	transformed	Constable	Herangi	by	substituting	him	with	
the	abstract	noun	‘the	authority’	(Transcript	of	Proceedings	2007:	69):	
	
Lochore:	…	there’s	this	appreciation	of	a	physical	sense	of	threat	as	well	as	threat	
engendered	 in	 the	 words	 used	 to	 the	 police	 officers.	 So	 it’s	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	
authority	in	that	sense.	…	
	
Justice	Johnson:	It	challenges	authority,	that	was	the	word	you	used	before?	
	
Lochore:	Yes,	that’s	what	I’m	building	up	to,	your	Honour	(emphasis	added).	
	
In	the	Supreme	Court	judgment,	Johnson	J	adopted	Lochore’s	characterisation	of	Heanes’s	words	
and	 the	 context	 in	 which	 they	 were	 used.	 Her	 Honour	 stated	 that	 a	 ‘theme’	 in	 a	 number	 of	
offensive	 language	 cases	 where	 police	 were	 involved	 is	 that	 language	 that	 challenges	 ‘the	
authority	of	police	officers’	is	likely	to	be	considered	disorderly	because	of	its	potential	‘to	incite	
others	to	involve	themselves	in	challenging	the	authority	of	the	officers’	(Heanes	v	Herangi:	214).	
Further,	 Johnson	 J	 stated	 that	 ‘words	 which	 ordinary	 decent‐minded	 people	 may	 consider	
acceptable	if	spoken	in	private	in	very	limited	circumstances,	may	not	be	considered	acceptable	
if	said	…	to	an	authority	figure’	(218,	emphasis	added).	
	
In	these	extracts	from	Heanes	v	Herangi,	swearing	at	police	officers	has	been	transformed	(van	
Leeuwen	2008)	 into	 the	more	 abstract	notions	of	 challenging	 authority	 or	 ‘inciting	 others’	 to	
challenge	authority.	Like	Jeffery’s	political	rhetoric	above,	there	is	also	a	collocation	of	the	words	
‘challenge’	and	‘authority’;	‘disrespect’	and	‘authority’;	and	‘respect’	and	‘police’.	This	authority	is	
not	qualified;	neither	Johnson	J	nor	counsel	for	the	respondent	explained	who	or	what	police	have	
authority	over—the	streets,	those	who	occupy	public	space,	 the	entire	populace?	Nor	did	they	
outline	possible	constraints	on	police	authority,	including	those	in	legislation	and	at	common	law.	
They	adopt	and	further	entrench	the	presumptions	that	police	should	go	unchallenged	in	public	
space,	and	that	swearing	at	police	challenges	their	authority	and	warrants	criminal	sanction.	With	
repetition	in	criminal	justice	discourse,	these	opinions	become	established	truths,	what	Hogg	and	
Brown	(1998:	18)	call	‘law	and	order	commonsense’.	
	
This	is	not	to	ignore	counter‐voices,	like	Gummow	and	Hayne	JJ	who	argued	in	the	High	Court	of	
Australia	that:	‘By	their	training	and	temperament	police	officers	must	be	expected	to	resist	the	
sting	of	insults	directed	to	them’	(Coleman	v	Power:	59).7	Justice	Harper	similarly	stated	in	the	
Supreme	Court	of	Victoria:	‘It	is	no	offence	simply	to	be	angry	with	the	authorities	(including,	of	
course,	 judicial	 authority)’	 (Ferguson	 v	Walkley	 2008:	 303).	 Yet,	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 the	
thousands	 of	 adults	 and	 children	proceeded	 against	 each	 year	 for	 offensive	 language	 in	NSW	
alone	(NSW	Bureau	of	Crime	Statistics	and	Research	2017,	see	above,	and	in	light	of	the	literature	
which	suggests	that,	in	many	offensive	language	incidents,	the	addressee	of	the	language	is	the	
police	 officer),	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 these	 alternative	 judicial	 opinions	 are	 having	 little	 impact	 on	
everyday	police	practice.	Further,	while	these	judges	call	on	police	officers	to	be	more	robust	in	
the	face	of	insults,	their	language	choices	still	reinforce	the	assumptions	that	swear	words	‘sting’	
police	and,	also,	that	police	have	authority—and,	indeed,	are	‘the	authorities’—in	public	space.		
	
Swearing,	authority	and	discourse	
	
Power	 gives	 a	 speaker	 the	 license	 to	 do	 things	 that	 the	 powerless	 cannot	 do.	
Dominance	legitimizes	invasions	of	personal	space,	touching	others,	engaging	in	
eye	contact,	and	addressing	subordinates	by	their	personal	names	rather	than	by	
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title	…	the	boss	can	tell	a	dirty	joke	and	the	workers	will	laugh,	but	not	vice	versa.	
(Jay	2000:	163)	
	
This	 article	 has	 examined	 representations	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 swearing,	 power	 and	
authority	in	criminal	justice	discourse.	It	has	argued	that	the	dominant	discourse	in	relation	to	
offensive	 language	 crimes	 postulates	 police	 officers	 as	 authority	 figures	 and	 represents	
challenging	that	authority,	by	using	‘four‐letter	words’,	as	criminal.	This	position	recognises	one	
of	 the	myriad	pragmatic	 functions	 of	 swear	words:	 as	 a	 verbal	 tool	 available	 to	marginalised	
individuals	or	groups	to	oppose	‘established	structures	of	power’	(Eble	1996:	124;	Jay	2000).	Like	
slang,	profanities	can	function	as	an	expression	of	opposition,	‘showing	a	range	of	attitudes	from	
slight	 irreverence	 to	downright	subversiveness’	 (Eble	1996:	124).	Below,	 the	article	examines	
situations	where	swear	words	have	been	used	to	challenge	unequal	power	relations,	particularly	
between	protesters	and	politicians;	and	Indigenous	Australians	and	police	officers.	It	contests	the	
notion	that	the	criminal	 law	should	promote	the	maintenance	of	unequal	power	structures	by	
punishing	swearing	at	police	in	public	space.	
	
Case	studies:	Cohen	v	California	and	Lim	v	The	Queen		
A	noteworthy	 case	 in	which	 swear	words	were	used	 to	 challenge	political	power	 is	 the	1971	
United	States	(US)	Supreme	Court	case	Cohen	v	California.	The	appellant,	Paul	Robert	Cohen,	had	
worn	a	 jacket	bearing	 the	phrase	 ‘Fuck	 the	Draft’	when	entering	 the	Los	Angeles	(LA)	County	
Courthouse.	 Cohen	 did	 so	 to	 protest	 US	 involvement	 in	 the	 Vietnam/American	 War	 and,	
principally,	the	government’s	use	of	military	conscription.	After	entering	the	courthouse,	Cohen	
removed	the	 jacket	and	draped	 it	over	his	arm.	He	was	subsequently	arrested	and	eventually	
convicted	 and	 sentenced	 in	 the	 LA	Municipal	 Court	 to	 30	 days’	 imprisonment	 for	 violating	 a	
Californian	crime	of	malicious	and	wilful	disruption	of	the	peace	by	offensive	conduct.		
	
Cohen	appealed	his	conviction	to	the	Court	of	Appeal	of	California,	and	then	to	the	US	Supreme	
Court.	The	Supreme	Court	quashed	his	conviction	on	the	basis	that,	consistent	with	the	First	and	
Fourteenth	Amendments	to	the	US	Constitution,	the	State	may	not	‘make	the	simple	public	display	
…	of	this	single	four‐letter	expletive	a	criminal	offense’.8	Justice	Harland	reasoned	that	(Cohen	v	
California:	24–25):	
	
To	many,	the	immediate	consequence	of	this	freedom	[of	expression]	may	often	
appear	to	be	only	verbal	tumult,	discord,	and	even	offensive	utterance	...	That	the	
air	may	at	times	seem	filled	with	verbal	cacophony	is,	in	this	sense	not	a	sign	of	
weakness	but	of	strength.	
	
An	examination	of	freedom	of	expression	as	it	pertains	to	swearing	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	
article	 (for	discussion,	see	Fairman	2006,	2009;	Gray	2012).9	However,	 the	example	has	been	
included	 here	 to	 highlight	 how	 the	 US	 Supreme	 Court,	 like	 Jeffery’s	 second	 reading	 speech	
extracted	above,	drew	on	metaphors	of	strength	and	weakness,	but	to	an	altogether	different	end.	
Rather	 than	 characterise	 challenges	 to	 established	 power	 structures	 via	 four‐letter	words	 as	
criminally	offensive,	Harland	J	suggested	that	a	strong	society	is	one	that	allows	for,	and	even	
protects,	dissident	voices.		
	
A	more	contemporary	example	in	which	swear	words	were	used	to	challenge	those	in	power	was	
when	‘peace	activist’	Danny	Lim	was	standing	on	a	busy	Sydney	road	one	morning	in	August	2015,	
wearing	a	sandwich	board	which	displayed	the	following	message:		
	
PEACE	SMILE		
PEOPLE	CAN	CHANGE		
“TONY	YOU	CUN’T.”	
LIAR,	HEARTLESS,	CRUEL		
PEACE	BE	WITH	YOU	
Elyse	Methven:	A	Little	Respect:	Swearing,	Police	and	Criminal	Justice	Discourse	
IJCJ&SD								69	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2018	7(3)	
The	sign	was	directed	at	then	Australian	Prime	Minister	Tony	Abbott.	Although	initially	convicted	
of	offensive	behaviour	in	the	Local	Court	proceedings,	District	Court	Judge	Scotting	overturned	
Lim’s	conviction.	Judge	Scotting	noted	that,	due	to	the	presence	of	the	apostrophe	in	‘CUN’T’	as	
well	as	the	strike	through	the	‘U’,	the	appellant	had	used	the	word	equivocally,	possibly	as	a	play	
on	words	for	‘can’t’.10	Even	if	Lim	had	used	the	word	‘cunt’	in	the	sign,	the	judge	reasoned	that	
this	word	was	 ‘not	 necessarily	 offensive’	 and	 that	 criticism	 of	 politicians	 is	 an	 ‘essential	 and	
accepted	part	of	any	democracy’	(Lim	v	The	Queen,	para	46‐48).	
	
These	examples	highlight	how	swear	words	can	function	to	challenge	existing	power	structures	
and	 those	 in	 powerful	 positions.	 Indeed,	 the	 facts	 of	 many	 offensive	 language	 cases	 can	 be	
(re)conceptualised	in	terms	of	acknowledgement	of,	and	resistance	to,	unequal	power	relations,	
whether	it	be:	a	man	uttering	an	insult	towards	police	in	anticipation	of	‘persecut[ion]’	in	Lismore,	
1991	 (McCormack	 v	 Langham);	 an	 Indigenous	 Australian’s	 resistance	 to	 British	 invasion	 and	
occupation	 of	 Aboriginal	 land	 in	 Redfern,	 1992	 (Conners	 v	 Craigie);	 a	 homeless	 Indigenous	
woman’s	rejection	of	police	power	and	control	in	Brisbane,	2000	(Del	Vecchio	v	Couchy);	a	young	
man’s	refusal	to	comply	with	police	directions	in	Perth,	2006	(Heanes	v	Herangi);	a	man’s	anger	
at	being	bitten	by	a	police	dog	in	Sydney,	2007	(Jolly	v	The	Queen);	a	young	man’s	frustration	over	
receiving	punishment	for	a	minor	transport	offence	in	Bondi,	2010	(Police	v	Grech);	or	same‐sex	
marriage	advocates	protesting	against	the	views	of	 ‘traditional	marriage’	advocates	in	Sydney,	
2016	(Police	v	Holcombe).		
	
Perceiving	these	case	facts	through	the	 lens	of	power	relations	raises	the	question	of	whether	
resistance	 to	 those	 in	 power,	 or	 political	 policies,	 expressed	 through	 swear	words,	 should	be	
considered	criminal?	If	we	answer	this	question	in	the	affirmative,	we	accept	that	a	key	function	
of	offensive	 language	crimes	 is	 to	enforce	police	 and	 the	 state’s	 authority	over	others;	 and	 to	
prevent	opposition	to	such	authority.	We	reject	the	proposition	advanced	by	Harlan	J	in	Cohen	v	
California	that	a	strong	society	is	one	that	allows	for,	and	even	protects,	dissident	voices.	And	we	
promote	 a	 system	 whereby	 police	 determine	 what	 is	 offensive	 according	 to	 their	 interests,	
overlooking	 the	 legal	 framing	of	offensive	 language	crimes	as	prohibiting	hypothetical	offence	
occasioned	to	 the	 fictitious	 ‘reasonable	bystander’.	 In	short,	we	accept	 the	proposition	 that	 to	
challenge	unequal	power	relations	within	a	public	setting	warrants	criminal	punishment.		
	
Police	swearing	at	members	of	the	public	
A	 corollary	 of	 this	 proposition	 is	 that,	 where	 police	 swear	 at	 or	 otherwise	 insult	 those	 with	
relatively	less	power,	the	criminal	law	does	not	intervene.	The	blindness	of	the	criminal	justice	
system	towards	injustices	perpetrated	by	police	and	the	state	towards	Indigenous	Australians	is	
routine	 in	 Australia.	 The	 Aboriginal	 Legal	 Services	 (NSW/ACT)	 regularly	 receives	 complaints	
about	swearing	and	racist	language	used	by	police	towards	Indigenous	people,	a	problem	also	
identified	by	the	Australian	Government’s	Royal	Commission	into	Aboriginal	Deaths	in	Custody	
(Australian	Human	Rights	Commission	1996).	In	1992,	an	ABC	documentary	Cop	it	Sweet	filmed	
police	arresting	and	charging	an	Indigenous	man	in	Redfern	for	swearing;	the	same	police	swore	
towards	members	of	the	public	without	reprimand	(Brockie	1992).		
	
The	 hypocrisy	 of	 police	 taking	 offence	 to	 swear	 words	 was	 further	 highlighted	 in	 the	 2016	
coronial	inquest	into	the	death	of	Ms	Dhu,	a	young	Indigenous	woman.	Ms	Dhu	had	died	in	August	
2014	at	the	age	of	22,	after	being	taken	into	police	custody	for	unpaid	fines	(many	of	which	were	
for	swearing	at	police)	(Fogliani	2016).	Shift	supervisor	Sergeant	Rick	Bond	gave	evidence	at	the	
inquest	into	her	death	that	he	had	whispered	into	Ms	Dhu’s	ear:	‘You’re	a	fuckin’	junkie’.	He	also	
said	it	was	normal	practice	in	the	Pilbara	for	police	officers	to	use	the	word	‘fuck’	to	detainees	
(Wahlquist	2016).	Ms	Dhu’s	fines	for	swearing	at	police,	her	callous	treatment	in	police	custody	
(she	was	mocked,	 ignored,	dismissed	and	laughed	at	by	police	as	her	symptoms	progressively	
worsened	until	she	died	of	overwhelming	stapphyloccal	infection),11	and	her	subsequent	death,	
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highlight	 the	 gross	hypocrisy	of	 a	 system	 that	punishes	members	 of	 the	public	who	 swear	 at	
police,	while	police	themselves	swear	with	impunity.		
	
Conclusion	
This	article	has	examined	the	central	place	of	discourse	in	naturalising	ideas	about	police	power,	
authority	and	order;	in	positioning	police	at	the	apex	of	public	space;	and	in	sustaining	unequal	
power	relations	between	police	and	(other)	members	of	the	public.	Discursive	constructions	of	
swearing	 at	 police	 in	 the	 criminal	 law	 have	 helped	 entrench	 a	 number	 of	 ‘common	 sense’	
assumptions	including	that:	police	officers	inherently	possess	authority;	police	officers	deserve	
respect	in	public	space;	current	unequal	social	structures	are	desirable	and	worth	preserving;	
and	 swear	words	 are	 undesirable	 because	 they	 subvert	 or	 destabilise	 this	 order.	Within	 this	
‘order’,	police	officers	who	swear	at	or	otherwise	disrespect	and	degrade	members	of	the	public	
escape	 punishment.	 This	 research	 advances	 a	 strong	 argument	 that	 the	 maintenance	 of	
unequal—and	often	unjust—power	relations	is	not	an	appropriate	end	of	criminal	punishment.	
Its	findings	also	point	to	a	need	to	reconsider	whether	swearing	at	police	should	remain	a	criminal	
offence.	
	
	
	
Correspondence:	 Dr	 Elyse	 Methven,	 Lecturer,	 Faculty	 of	 Law,	 Faculty	 of	 Law,	 University	 of	
Technology	Sydney,	Broadway	NSW	2007,	Australia.	Email:	elyse.methven@uts.edu.au	
	
	
1	This	editorial	was	written	in	response	to	the	2009	NSW	Local	Court	case	of	Police	v	Grech,	an	offensive	language	case	
examined	in	this	article.		
2	Crimes	Act	1900	(ACT)	s	392;	Summary	Offences	Act	1988	(NSW)	s	4A;	Summary	Offences	Act	1978	(NT)	ss	47	and	53;	
Summary	Offences	Act	1966	(Vic)	s	17(1)(c);	Summary	Offences	Act	2005	(Qld)	s	6;	Summary	Offences	Act	1953	(SA)	s	
7(1)(a);	Police	Offences	Act	1935	(Tas)	s	12.	
3	The	Police	Offences	Act	1935	(Tas)	s	12	makes	it	a	crime	to	‘curse	or	swear’	in	any	public	place,	or	within	the	hearing	
of	any	person	in	that	place.		
4	In	Australia,	the	Liberal–National	Coalition	is	a	predominantly	conservative	party.	
5	As	a	Queensland	police	officer	said	in	2008:	‘I	can	get	called	names	all	day	and	I	don’t	arrest.	But	if	members	of	the	
public	hear	 someone	swearing	at	me,	 then	 I	arrest’	 (Queensland	Crime	and	Misconduct	Commission	2008:	116).	
Similarly,	a	NSW	police	officer	stated	in	2009:	‘I’m	not	going	to	let	anyone	walk	down	the	street	and	just	swear	at	me	
when	I’m	off	duty	or	on	duty	or	whatever	…	people	see	you	and	they	expect	you	to	take	action	...	there’s	expectations	
…	that	you	will	enforce	these	minor	things’	(NSW	Ombudsman	2009:	60).	
6	 Constable	Herangi	 alleged	 that,	 approximately	 five	minutes	 prior	 to	 the	defendant	 swearing	 at	 him,	Heanes	 had	
bumped	 into	 the	 right	 hip	 of	 Constable	Herangi’s	 partner,	 Constable	 Paul,	with	 his	 right	 elbow,	 then	 ‘continued	
walking	on’.	Heanes	gave	evidence	that	he	had	walked	between	the	two	officers	without	bumping	into	them.	It	was	
this	‘incident’	that	compelled	Constables	Herangi	and	Paul	to	pursue	Heanes	(Transcript	of	Proceedings	2006:	3‐5).	
7	This	echoes	the	sentiment	in	the	English	Divisional	Court	case	DPP	v	Orum:	‘words	and	behaviour	with	which	police	
officers	will	be	wearily	familiar	will	have	little	emotional	impact	on	them	save	that	of	boredom’.	
8	Relevantly,	Amendment	1	of	the	Bill	of	Rights	provides	that	‘Congress	shall	make	no	law	respecting	an	establishment	
of	religion,	or	prohibiting	the	free	exercise	thereof;	or	abridging	the	freedom	of	speech,	or	of	the	press;	or	the	right	of	
the	people	peaceably	to	assemble,	and	to	petition	the	government	for	a	redress	of	grievances’.	Cohen’s	words	did	not	
fall	 into	 the	 US’s	 ‘fighting	 words’	 exception	 of	 free	 speech	 protection	 because	 there	 was	 no	 direct,	 provocative	
personal	insult.	The	Court	also	held	it	was	not	an	obscenity	case,	as	the	use	of	the	words	was	not	‘in	some	significant	
way,	erotic’	(see	Fairman	2006:	1733‐1736).	
9	 The	 relationship	 between	 swearing,	 power	 and	 freedom	 of	 speech	 would	 benefit	 from	 further	 inquiry	 in	 the	
Australian	context	with	regards	to	the	implied	freedom	of	political	communication	in	the	Australian	Constitution.	
Anthony	Gray	(2012)	has	written	on	this	subject,	although	not	with	regards	to	the	legitimacy	of	punishing	challenges	
to	or	subversion	of	‘authority’;	these	aspects	have	been	examined	in	a	US	context	in	Robbins	(2008).	
10	The	prosecution	case	was	 that	 the	appellant	had	 inverted	a	rounded	capital	A	 in	 the	word	to	refer	 to	the	Prime	
Minister	as	a	‘cunt’.		
11	She	was	twice	taken	to	Hedland	Health	Campus,	and	both	times	returned	to	the	police	station.	Officers	and	doctors	
testified	 they	 thought	 Ms	 Dhu	 was	 faking	 being	 sick	 and	 that	 she	 was	 merely	 suffering	 from	 drug	 withdrawal	
symptoms	(Wahlquist	2016).		
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